The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914

As we approach the centennial of World War I next year, the flow of books dissecting the Great War continues. Fortunately, in recent decades, the historical analysis of the War has become increasingly informed and sophisticated. No longer is the exclusive focus on "who" caused the war (traditionally the Germans and Kaiser Bill in particular); rather now the primary issues is "how" the war came about and the economic and political developments that facilitated it. While this is a much more complicated issue, much progress has been made as is evidenced in this fine book by Margaret MacMillan, the author of the magisterial "Paris 1919." While MacMillan does not resolve all issues, this is certainly the most complete analysis we have on how we got from 1870 to the fireworks of 1914. The hallmark of the author's "Paris 1919" was detailed examination of virtually every factor that played a role in hammering out the Versailles peace treaty ending the Great War. She follows that approach here as well, delivering 645 pages of text, supported by 39 pages of notes. This means that there is a lot of not always necessary detail in her discussion, but the reader is made aware of virtually every pertinent fact. Also, one of her strengths, particularly evident here, is that she focuses on the key individual actors (Sir Edward Grey and the Kaiser being just two examples), not just the big events, so that the reader develops somewhat a "feel" for the personality and outlook of these folks. After a helpful introduction, MacMillan sets the stage in her initial chapters by focusing on Europe in 1900 and then individual chapters on Germany, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, and Russia. This approach is somewhat reminiscent of Tuchman's "The Proud Tower" though much more thoroughly done here. Sprinkled within these chapters are discussions of key issues such as the competition for colonies (a key irritant to Germany); the German-British naval rivalry, including development of the powerful Dreadnought; the uncomfortable relationship between France and Britain; German ties to Austria-Hungary; and the puzzling role of Russia and the Tsar in these developments. The key actors emerge with a good degree of clarity: Nicholas the Tsar; Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary; the key British politicians involved (including a very young Churchill pictured on the book's cover with Kaiser Bill); the Kaiser and his uncle Edward VII; and the somewhat perplexed French leadership. MacMillan then unleashes some of her most important chapters where she clarifies issues that at least to me have been somewhat confusing. One of her best chapters ("What Were They Thinking?") expands on one of her concerns evident throughout the book: how could a prosperous and technologically progressive Europe ever have gotten into this mess? She then discusses in depth those famous war plans and alliance commitments that played such a great role in Tuchman's "The Guns of August." Here she corrects and refines Tuchman's enormous reliance upon these factors which Tuchman believed led to virtually an automatic march to war with little human control. She follows this up with thorough examinations of some key precursors to the war: the Morocco Crises and the Balkan Wars (which I never thought from other books I would ever begin to understand). Then it is to Sarajevo and the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand. By this point, we see Europe buried in kindling just awaiting the match to set things off. A discussion of the mechanics of the formal war process and the last week of peace, and an insightful epilogue, wrap up the book. In her intro, MacMillan suggests that we probably may never know all the factors that "caused" the Great War. But we certainly are significantly closer to that goal thanks to this fine book. Her joint focus on events and individual personalities (and weaknesses) helps establish a context for how the war exploded that is comprehensive and rarefied.

We will never know exactly all the whys and hows of the FirstWW.All actors are long gone and we are trying to deduce conclusions from shadows and footprints and a scholarship that has produced thousands of volumes on the subject.There are now possibly fifty books that if all are read we can have an accurate enough understanding of what happened.This is one of those books,mainly addressed to the initiated British Public that has already read the basics The work has two main assets.First the long time span examined up to August 1914 and second the broadness of scope in the examination of the many facets that composed the perception of National Interest for every Nation and their interplay with the corresponding ones of the other Nations. Prof Mac Millan's work is clear,well researched,analytical and intelligently critical,particularly of other Nations not Britain,methodical and easy to follow in its rationale.Most of the arguments advanced are solidly based on facts and logic. Certain passages could have been eliminated to the benefit of the coherence and readability of the book.It is tiring to read the relations of the deputy minister of the Foreign Office of Germany with the second cousin of the Secretary of the War Office of Russia. The author cautions to the dangers of the assumption that the War was bound to happen,although reading the book one wonders how it could have been avoided in view of the strength of the usual suspects presented and analysed,Militarism,Nationalism,Social Darwinism etc. The author points out significantly that the War happened as a result of decisions taken by relatively few key Players,as a result of various pressures well identified and described in the book and that this happened over a considerable period of time. The final result was the failure of those Statesmen to rationally manage the ultimate crisis. Although not condemned expressis verbis ,Germany and A-H come out as the principals responsible for the War for the well known reasons. Kaiser Bill was already sketched as a caricature by many Historians but Mac Millan's one is in full color. The author presents both the forces of Societies defending Peace and those pushing towards War.Her understanding of military matters is weak. She makes a valid point that the Civilian Leaderships were not ensnared by the military train timetables,but rather by their own decisions not to insist on better understanding with their Military and demand military planning flexibility and options. On the surprise that the author is showing that military plans were aggressive,this is the military Dogma throughout the ages. On the Schlieffen plan,instead of this or any other author,the reader is referred to T. Zuber's "The Real German War Plan 1904-14" which is the only work that puts this much misunderstood plan in its real dimensions. The statement by Prof Mac Millan that on the eve of the Great War the French Army was poorly led and overly bureaucratic is unfair . This Army was certainly better and more efficiently led than the BEF,the victorious Marne battle is the final proof.The flexibility with which more than half of its right wing was rapidly transferred to the centre and left shows that it was both strategically perceptive and administratively capable. The moral failure of the German and BEF leaderships contrasts starkly with the rock solid and unflappable French one. While the author devotes irrelevant pages to the History of the Ottoman Empire (a St Antony trait),she gives only a few paragraphs to describe the schemings of Sir Edward Gray and the machinations of Gen. Henry Wilson to fight alongside France without Cabinet approval and Parliamentary knowledge.There is a curious reluctance of British Historians who are the only ones that can do a Fritz Fischer on British Policy of those times but avoid it.Prof Clark was the only one who provided some information so far. Finally having read extensively on WW1 I have ceased to be surprised that the primary responsibility of Serbia is passed over once again.I did not find any originality in the conclusions but the work is solid and in line with current scholarship, although I would prefer to see the author take a clear position as to the responsibility of the States for the War.Fritz Fisher did the dirty job indicting his own Country but Prof Mac Millan after exposing Germany and Austria avoids the final step,and she is not alone.AJP Taylor was more cantankerous but he had the strength of his convictions. DVK

As we approach the centennial anniversary of the outbreak of World War One we should pause to reflect on the terrible loss that conflict brought. In terms of western culture, 1914 was truly a watershed year that ended one way of life and introduced another. Margaret MacMillan followed up her epic study of the Versailles Treaty with this equally impressive work. She attempts to show how the war came about primarily because too many people either wanted war or did not do enough to prevent it from happening. The result is perhaps the most thorough analysis of the pre-1914 world available to the modern reader. MacMillan begins her book with an account of the major players (France, Germany, Russia, Britain, and Austria-Hungary) to illustrate their national hopes and dreams pitted against their fears and suspicions andn introduces the reader to the primary individuals who helped shape national policy. She then looks at the psychology of war and the peace efforts and compares them to the militarism that each nation experienced. She describes how the new concept of public opinion helped drive the leaders towards certain decisions. Next she looks at the series of run ups to the Great War's outbreak, Morocco, Bosnia, the Balkan Wars, and even the assassination of the Austrian archduke and his wife. None of these events meant that war was ultimiately inevitable. So long as there were at least some key players willing to negotiate and work through differences, war could be avoided. MacMillan concludes that war came about because the forces that sought it outnumbered and outmanourvered those who did not. But she also works to debunk myths that have evolved over the years. Germany and the Kaiser were not solely responsible for war in 1914. Germany had repeated backed down in the face of international pressure during the Morocco crises of 1905 and 1911. The Kaiser, while having the personality that modern day people would call a "jerk" (or worse), had a way of standing down at the last minute. Granted, he was fascinated with all things military, he was the inheritor of the Prussian military tradition, but he did not set out to bring war upon the world as he has often been blamed for doing. She also critiques the Anglo-French entente that developed after 1904. Britain and France were not a unified front as British leaders continually looked for ways to be non-committal in backing France on international affairs. She also looks at the relationship between France and Russia, and considers the challenges facing Austria-Hungary and the upstart Serbia. All of these have had myths develop around them and MacMillan works through the hyperbole to understand the root causes of national decisions. In fact, MacMillan ultimately blames no one and everyone for the war. The Great War, and she uses this term throughout the book, was the sum total of government's unwillingness to resort to diplomacy when the world needed eiplomacy the most. MacMillan is not only a fine historian but is also an excellent writer. Thoughout the book she interjects modern analogies to compare with her subject matter to help illustrate her points. One key such analogy appears near the end of the book when she states how John F. Kennedy employed diplomacy against the advice of his advisors in part because he had recently read Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August. Kennedy gave diplomacy a chance, the players of 1914 did not. MacMillan's writing style is crisp and lively. Truly, there is never a dull moment in this book. College history courses should utilize this book. The leaders of today should read this book. The average citizen who thinks that guns and war solve problems should read this book. There are lessons to be learned from MacMillan that need to be understood and appreciated. This book has all the makings of a Pulitzer Prize and as such cannot be discounted by anyone who is in the position of decision-making in international affairs. And on a large scale, that really means all of us, as public opinion is now counted for much by politicians and pollsters. This book should remain the standard for a long time to come, much like her work in Paris 1919 remains the standard for understanding our modern world as it resulted from the Paris peace conference.

With the centennial of the outbreak of Wortd War I upon us, a torrent of books on the topic has been unleashed. When I clicked on "The War That Ended Peace" in Amazon, two other major histories on the prelude to the War popped up at the bottom of the page (Clark's "Sleepwalkers" and Harris' "Catastrophe 1914", and Amazon shows 16 PAGES of books on the War due for publication next year. That list will surely grow. So why read this one? Because it is as good as all the glowing reviews suggest, for three reasons. The history is excellent. The writing is excellent. And the book makes the reader think. To begin with the history, Ms. MacMillan is a noted historian with no need to prove her mastery of this period. She studied history at Oxford, focussing on the late 19th and early 20th centuries, has taught on the period and on international relations in particular, and is widely published. But for me, what stood out about the history in this book wasn't the qualifications of the writer, but the vividness with which she used sources from the period, and her thoroughness in trying to make clear each point of view in each crisis. Her analysis demonstrates the extent to which individuals had an impact on Europe's progress from peace to war, and she brings this out in vivid sketches of the key men of the time (only a few women, mostly wives, but that's the way it was). As to the writing, she is very clear about very complex events, a difficult and most welcome accomplishment. More than that, her writing is a pleasure to read. It pulled me along despite all the names and places and military rumblings. Finally, as to her ideas, Ms. MacMillan makes it clear that she does not believe that the FIrst World War was inevitable. That is a bitterly argued point in historiography, with many arguing that nothing could have been done to stop it. If World War 1 was indeed inevitable, it does not have many lessons for the current day: we, presumably, have our own inevitabilities, which will continue peace (for some, at least) or move us into war. But if World War ! was not inevitable, one can study the choices and decisions that helped bring it about, in the hope of learning from past mistakes. Ms. MacMillan clearly thinks that this is appropriate, noting that there are some similiarities between the world of 1914, and the world of today. I can't compare this book to the other two "big" entrants in the how-Wortd-War-I began stakes, or indeed to Barbara Tuchman's "Guns of August", which I read too long ago to remember in any detail. But I do intend to reread Tuchman, and to read "Sleepwalkers" and "Catastrophe 1914". After doing so, I may revise my review of "The War the Ended Peace". I shall be very surprised, however, if I revise my very high opinion of it.

I wish to state that I have read many books covering this insane moment in modern history, known at the time as "The Great War. This includes the lead up and history leading directly into this 1914-1918 war of horrors and, the after shocks including the continuation of warfare through the 1920 leading right up to WWII. But I found this book much superior to past pieces on the subject. The author spells out the causes and effects, the politics of the time and the ridiculous honor codes and macho humbo-gumbo of the era. He fully explains regional politics and wars leading up to August 1914 and their lasting effects. The behind the doors diplomacy to avert what was recognized to become a blood bath. A total description of trench warfare with all its horrors, which entail the useless mass infantry attacks, the effects of the machine gun and artillery, the use of poison gas and the flame thrower, the rotting bodies, the stench, the mud, the thousands of dead horses, the horribly maimed, the uselessness of the war of attrition and its final outcome, the antiquated idea of warfare used by the generals. The author covers the subject from A-Z and proves beyond a reasonable doubt the insanity, stupidity, egotistical, ridiculous, block-headed reasons for entering into one of the most useless bloodletting endeavors that literately destroyed an entire generation of European youth, eliminated for ever the Ottoman Empire, Tsarists Russia, The Austrian-Hungarian (Hapsburg) Empire, The German Empire, almost wrecked the French Republic, diminished The British Empire. Its effects turned, Americans against future involvement in European politics, while ruining the health of U.S. President Wilson who needlessly involved himself (unwisely) by embroiling himself into the peace talks of 1919. Worst of all, it set up all the ingredients necessary to lead us up and into the next world war, just 21 years later which dwarfed the so called "Great War," a/k/a "The War To End Wars," The "Great War" should have been named: "The Great Calamity." For all you history buffs, I highly recommend this well researched book. The author leaves nothing to the imagination and when you have finished reading this book you will have no doubts about this idiotic time in mans history. A tragedy beyond human comprehension and yes I have read "Guns of August" and a dozen other books covering WWI, but this author touches on the heart of this subject and leaves nothing to the imagination. The modern day reader will have trouble wrapping his hands around the facts and mind set of the leaders reasoning at the beginning of the 20th century which defy all common sense. History goes on to prove that that so-called common sense is still lacking.

If you think you know WWI you must read this book. The author, Margaret MacMillian takes a different look at the old story. This different look will cause you to re-evaluate World War I. Margaret MacMillan takes a big look at the events and personalities before the war. The common view of the war is it almost started by accident. This book will change your mind. It is highly detailed, readable, and enjoyable. It presents a view of the world which will make you realize the war seemed almost inevitable. The war represented a mark in time. Forces then were changing the world. The war just accelerated that change. Margaret also makes several references to current times to communicate the events back then. That tactic did make the story come more alive. The world was so different before the war. The book really demonstrates that. Margaret's descriptions of the major characters of each government makes them come alive. The trends of society were undergoing a huge change. Populist trends were hitting the governments of Europe. Political parties were increasing their holds on society. These people at times stood in contrast to the monarchists. One example is in Britain. The country had 138,000 people on strike in 1899. The number of strikers in 1912 was in excess of 1,000,000. The strategic views were also very similar to today. She documents how the Germans viewed the fleet as a symbol of national power, much like carriers or bombers today. The threat of them was enough to justify the use. Many viewed war as something that would never happen. The politics were just games nations play. Britain and Germany were each other's greatest trading partners. Prior to 1914 the nations of Europe had conflicts several times over Morocco and the Balkans. That made the fears over the shooting of the Archduke Ferdinand seem not real. However things still erupted. The nation's still bumbled into war. The author captured the confusion of the moment really well. Margaret documents how governments did make firm decisions that pushed things over the top. She really does document well how the Germans were the aggressors. That is something that stands in contrast to to other books. You can see how nation's made big decisions with incomplete information. That makes the war ever more scary. Her great painting of the world before 1914 makes the average reader realize how the war changed things even more than any other book.

It seems that wars are started for similar reasons. Greed and raw ambition have something to do with them. Confusion and stupidity often are woven into them. Missed chances and pride frequently play a role. All of these tragically came together in the runup to World War I. Katherine MacMillan looked at the far end of the war in her Paris 1919 which brilliantly told the story of how world leaders assembled in the French capital just after hostilities ended to redraw national boundaries and present onerous financial terms to a defeated and exhausted Germany. Now, she focuses on the extraordinary circumstances that precipitated this savage and draining war that began almost exactly100 years ago. This is a complex history and it could not be told with more comprehension and analytical power than in this extraordinary book. She starts in the early days of the century, with Germany feeling increasingly isolated – France to its west, Russia to its east and Britain, initially uncommitted but steadily leaning against Germany. The story moves from the European colonies in North Africa, most under French control, to the restless Balkan countries, hotbeds of Slavic resistance to the Teutonic powers to their north. It seems easy, probably too easy, to isolate the crazed act of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914 as the single act that caused the war. But this spark, which took the life of perhaps Serbia’s strongest Austrian political friend, set in motion the machinery that soon engulfed all Europe in a way that would destroy 8.5 million lives and wound 21 million, most severely. MacMillan, who throughout this story brings the reader from the distant history of a world war to close historical parallels in present-day Europe and America, contrasts these numbers -- only to bring the scale of the slaughter in World War I -- to the 4,800 coalition troops tragically killed in Iraq. Reading this history, though it is a compelling story, requires the reader to keep track of dozens of kings, queens, ministers, presidents, officers, politicians, and revolutionaries. Some of these figures are well known to the American reader but many are not. MacMillan clearly describes this huge cast but it would probably be worthwhile to keep a written list of the major characters. As the war ground on, the outlines of a remarkably different Europe began to take shape. Austria was through as a great power. Yugoslavia rose from the ashes of the enfeebled Slavic monarchies. The Russian royal family was shot and a people’s republic, which became anything but, was formed. Germany was exhausted but, more than any European power, pulled itself gradually together, so much so that it was able to restart its amazing military engines less than twenty years later. The United States retreated into isolation. France became a revolving door of generally inept leaders. Most of European royalty were either gone or killed. This is a history of a war that seemed unnecessary but which ultimately became terrifyingly real.

I would not add a review to the many already published ones, but they neglect main lessons to be drawn from the comprehensive and enlightening treatment in this (and other) books of the path to World War One. I will try to partly rectify this omission by prevent five of the lessons that I draw from this book, directly and indirectly. But let me start with two point of criticism: (1) the author inserts a number of uncalled-for and partly misleading comparisons to recent and current issues (e.g., pp. 561, 563). And (2) the index does nor covering subjects, as necessary in such a book. But, of course, these aberrations do not impair the high quality of the book as a whole. Moving on to the five crucial lessons, out of many more, here they are in a nutshell: 1. “There are always choices” (p. 645). However important cultures, imaginaries, implicit assumptions and so on are in shaping history and choices, historic processes are not over-determined. Thus, the World War did not have to happen. It is quite likely that some war was hard to avoid given the stream of events. However it could have been local and limited in scope and consequences. As stated by the author “it so easily could have been different” (p. 140). True, decision makers were subject to many constraints, such as posed by growing importance of public opinion and mass media. But, still, they had a range of options and significant freedom of choice. Therefore if a leader claims “I had no other choice,” he is either at least partly blind or not saying all of the truth. 2. Very few top level politicians and senior advisors make critical choices shaping the fate of multitudes. As explicated clearly by the author “the decisions that took Europe into the war – or failed to prevent it – were made by a surprising small number” (p. 247 and 249). This continues to be the case in many though not all critical domains, despite liberal democracy, the importance of “public space,” and so on. A few top level politicians and their senior advisors do impact significantly on the future, increasingly so given the growing capacities of human action to shape the future thanks to the tools supplied by science and technology. 3. Civilian leaders should closely supervise military planning and choices, going also into details. As stated by the author “Europe’s civilian leaders failed, first by not informing themselves as to what their war plans entailed and secondly by not insisting on a range of plans…” (p. 323). This grave error has in no way disappeared, much of military planning in many countries suffering from inadequate political supervision and direction; and many top level political leaders lacking the will, knowledge and staffs to do what is necessary. 4. Forget Clausewitz! Despite awareness of the effectiveness of machine guns and barbered wire for stopping massive infantry attacks, the “the lessons were not that the attack no longer worked but that it had to be pressed harder, with more men” (p. 329). Examples abound, then and now, of militaries fighting the next conflict with the doctrines learned from the last one, also when using novel technologies. Given the rapid changes in political, social and normative contexts and the wherewithal of conflicts, my conclusion is that military history and most of “classical” military theory, including writings of Clausewitz, are becoming more misleading than enlightening. 5. The quality of high level politicians must be radically improved. The problems facing humanity are getting even more serious, such as environmental degradation, increasing possibilities to synthesize mass killing viruses in “kitchen laboratories,” and “human enhancement.” Free markets, self-regulation by scientists and so on cannot cope with them, doing so being the mission of politicians. But there is no reason to assume that present political leaders are now better than those in charge of the choices bringing about the catastrophe of the First World War and its repercussions: Communism, Nazism, the Second World War and their barbarities. Therefore, the most important lesson which I draw from the road to World War One, as ably presented in this book, is that the taboo subject of radically improving democratic political leaders must be seriously taken up. Reading this book and pondering seriously its lessons is therefore strongly recommended. I will surely include it in the recommended reading list of my next book. Professor Yehezkel Dror The Hebrew University of Jerusalem