The War in the West - A New History: Volume 1: Germany Ascendant 1939-1941

I thought Holland showed a solid skill in integrating the many layers involved in a global conflict. The personal views of servicemen and women meshed well with observations of Presidents and Prime Ministers. His anchoring of his analysis in the strategic elements of material's resources combined with a focus on logistics adds the element of practicality too often missing from the analysis of warfare.

Another cant put down once opened from James Holland 👍 would like Vol 3 when available .

This is a fascinating book, and proved much quicker and easier to read than the weight of the tome first suggested when it crashed through my letter box. Holland's argument is that Great Britain always stood a far greater chance of a successful outcome in the Second World War than historians have traditionally tended to assert. The prevailing view of the war in Western Europe from a UK perspective is one in which years of early failure nearly led to collapse, and only edged towards victory as a result of Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the arrival in the war on our side in December that year of the USA. Holland argues, however, that the weaknesses in British arms between 1939 and 1941 did not mean that defeat was ever inevitable and that in actuality the seeds of eventual British success were strongly evident from the outset of the war. It would have been nice to have had some military victories to fall back on during these years, and to have fought better (in North Africa and Norway, for instance) but they in and of themselves did not make Britain's failure, collapse or surrender inevitable. Through a combination of inherent British strengths (such as rearmament in the late 1930s, her worldwide economic reach, closeness of ties with the USA and power and responsiveness of the Commonwealth at the outset of war) together with Axis strategic ineptitude, military weaknesses (disguised by the use of superb propaganda) and repeated follies, a positive outcome for Britain in the war was always much more certain than we have traditionally assumed. This produces a much more positive view of Britain's expectations than the prevailing narrative has allowed, and is a welcome re-balance of perspective about the relative strengths and weaknesses of both sides of the Allied/Axis camp in the first three years of the war. This is not a rarefied account. Holland helpfully uses real peoples' experiences to illustrate his arguments, and throughout backs up his contentions with a wealth of helpful information and data.

This is a well-informed operational account of the war in Europe which incorporates the personal narratives of politicians, soldiers and civilians. The author claims to present a “new” version of the war opposed to popular knowledge “steeped in perceptions and myth rather than fact.” Friendly reviews in the news media and on Amazon have accepted these claims. In such a way the straw man of popular misconception is put to convenient use and even allowing for a certain amount of sales puffery I find the claim of “new” to be over-stated.However I do like the book and found it an enjoyable read despite the exaggerated claims of the friendly reviews. For me the rewarding parts of the book were the personal details and narratives, and most of them I was unfamiliar with. But the essential information about the war and its combatants has been known or available for decades. For example, some reviewers indicate that Mr. Holland’s comparative account of the raw materials situation and industrial infrastructure/armaments industries of the main combatants is new – it is not. The new and refreshing aspect is that Holland deftly integrates such content into his narrative though it has been available for decades. Some people have mistaken other recent books as bringing previously forgotten or hidden knowledge to the fore. Two books were mentioned in a favorable review in the Wall Street Journal (10 October 2015). They are David Edgerton’s ”Britain’s War Machine” (2011) and Adam Tooze’s “The Wages of Destruction” (2006). I have read the latter but not yet the former. But earlier authors who dealt with the subject are Burton Klein (1959) and Alan Milward (1965 and 1976). And of course there are the volumes of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey and the dozens of volumes of Britain’s official “The History of the Second World War,” one of which dealt specifically with raw materials and supply. I do see that the volumes of the official British history of the war are found throughout Holland’s bibliography. Holland’s “The Rise of Germany” evidences that he knows his subject and literature quite well.There was one section on the equipment, uniforms and mechanization of the British Army and the German Army I thought very well done. The British Expeditionary Force sent to France in 1939-40 was a thoroughly modernized and mechanized force; only a small portion of the German Army was similarly equipped. But mechanization is expensive and the size of the respective armies relevant here – a small British Army versus a German one many times its size. Anyone who is familiar with the Battle of France or the German Army knows that most of the German infantry marched into France and much of the transport was horse-drawn. None of this is remarkable and has always been known by students of the period.Holland does present a picture here and there that is troubling and at odds with my memories from other books. For example Holland gives emphasis to Generals Dill and Wavell who changed their minds about sending British troops to Greece after Churchill requested it (p. 488). My recollection is that they reluctantly did so as obedient professional soldiers because it meant a diminution of resources poised to defeat the Italians in North Africa. In any case the Germans did invade Yugoslavia and Greece and a stout British resistance with the help of the Royal Navy prevented a catastrophe though at some cost. Mr. Holland mentions in several places the strategic mistake the Germans made by invading these countries which it certainly was. Nowhere did I see such an assertion made about the British move into Greece – a similarly foolish strategic move in my opinion. For all of this foolishness by the combatants the Greek nation paid a very high price indeed as a battleground and occupied country.In short, as Holland observes and I agree, Germany was ill-positioned to fight a long war – no surprise there. German leadership knew and understood this, and likewise the British who studied the subject very thoroughly even before the outbreak of war in September 1939. The German war machine had its limitations and all choices made by the Germans involved an opportunity cost and balancing of projected needs. Once war occurred the Allied leadership expected some variation of the circumstances of World War I where Germany with insufficient materiel for war is ultimately pushed to defeat by blockade and attrition. This latter point is omitted in Mr. Holland’s account as is much context for his operational history of the war. German success in the invasion and occupation of Denmark and Norway in April 1940, and then defeating the Allied armies in the field in May-June 1940 was something no one of either side anticipated, thus prolonging the war of “blockade and attrition” though on a grander scale.While “The Rise of Germany” does have its shortcomings it is a fine operational account of the European war, as promised by the author, and a good read enhanced by the personal details of so many participants.

A really enjoyable book. A fresh take on the early years of the war in Europe, emphasising the relative weakness of Germany and how Britain, despite many reverses, was in fact in a relatively strong position. It stresses the importance of the British Empire and Commonwealth, alongside the USA, in providing vital men and resources for the war against Germany. This simultaneously challenges the idea of Britiain being alone in 1940 and the myth of German invincibility.Most interestingly for me was the argument that Germany's economic weakness affected its strategy to a great extent. Britian was in fact outproducing Germany and was less affected by rationing than Germany by 1941. In the winter of 1939, the allied blockade of Germany was biting as hard as it had in 1916/1917 and only rapid victory over a militarily superior France and the quick plundering of its resources could stave off serious problems. Likewise by 1941, after the initial windfall of resources from the conquest of most of Europe, Germany was struggling to feed itself and its new empire while simultaneously fighting Britian and bailing out Italy. The need for resources wedded to the fear of eventual US involvement pushed Germany into seeking a vicious assualt on the USSR. A deliberate policy of taking food from the Soviet population to feed the Reich and oil from the Caucasus was Hitler's only answer to the blockade maintained by the British Empire.From a military perspective, its most interesting revelation is that the German army of 1939-40 was in fact not a highly mechanised force, as only a minority of units were fully mechanised and equipped with panzers. Although Guderian's units practiced what was named by others as Blitzkrieg, the German army was more dependent on horses than either Britain or France. Division and confusion in the allied command chains contributed as much to German victory in 1939-40 as new strategic practices and when entrenched in proper defensive positions, the British and French armies performed very well.The structure is at times a little confusing, as the book is told through a series of characters and personal stories, leavened with first hand accounts which at times confuse the point, but overall a great read.