The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis: A RAND Corporation Research Study

Many in uniform (and almost all civilians) don’t have a good grounding in the differences among the branches of the US military. These differences aren’t superficial; they run deep and they have a great influence on the way the branches see themselves, engage each other, and prepare for war. The author has an obvious appreciated for what each branch brings to the table, and manages to present it in an approachable non-academic way.This is a great book, well thought out and presented, but nothing is ever perfect. I’ll focus on the negatives because that’s more interesting:The author is up front about his pro-Army bias, so I won’t hold that tendency against him, but make no mistake it’s there and he has blind spots to Air Force and Navy concepts. Only the Army, Navy, and Air Force are discussed – leaving out the Marine Corps and Space Force. The Marine Corps is considered culturally part of the Navy for the purposes of this book, which was probably fair at the time of the writing, but developments since (and some savvy lobbying efforts) have seen the USMC grow in stature and emerge with its own strategic vision which does not always align with the Navy’s. Space Force was (obviously) not independent at the time of the writing, but things are changing rapidly within the Department of the Air Force; today Air Force seems more “corporate” while Space Force has taken on the mantle of “technology first”. Some of the commentary on the branches is showing its age; in 2022 the looming peer threat is unquestionably China so some Air Force/Navy preoccupations and quirks that the author bristles at (eg ship and aircraft counts) seem more reasonable and even prophetic by the day. His characterization of the Army’s culture as the loyal servant of the nation willing to do whatever the country asks rings hollow after two decades of the War on Terror in which the Army had a great deal of sway over policymaking and exerted great influence on her sister branches and their priorities. The author gets closest to the truth, I think, when he brings focus to the Army’s contradictions: Citizen/soldier or professional? Garrison force or imperial force? People-centered or technology centered? For all the ink spilled on jointness and how the branches tend to approach problems, little time is spent on the difference in nature between forward-based and expeditionary forces and the rest of the military. The Navy deploys constantly in wartime and peacetime alike and seems to be especially adept at the quasi-diplomatic soft-power functions. Working with allied partners and contractors (in acquisitions and in-theater) is increasingly a large part of what today’s military does – not including those concepts was a lost opportunity.Highly recommended overall, but it’s showing its age and would be a great candidate for a new edition or spiritual successor.

Military reformers have often been frustrated when what seem like highly rational ideas for greater military effectiveness meet with passive or active resistance by various sections of the military establishment. What Carl Builder did in this book was to abandon attempts of dredge through ancient history and instead try to understand what fundamental motivations the three major services bring to considerations of proposed change. He found each military service to be a complex organism with internal differences and tensions but each with a specific key motivational paradigm. As clearly stated by other reviewers, the Air Force sees the love of flight and flying to be the central principle that guides it forward, the Navy sees the sanctity of independent command of the ship as basic to by its organizing principle and the Army sees itself as the faithful and dutiful servant of the nation and its population validated by it's role and function in 1944/5.If this were all Carl Builder had done, it would have explained a great deal, but there is more to this book than some specific insight that left to itself might be interesting but not all that significant. In addition, the author spent some time describing what he means by strategy and by analysis and then shows how each service's self image affects its style of doing strategy and doing analysis. Finally, Builder tries to wrap up his understanding of these matters by reviewing the implications for national military planning and the prospects of change.Something that makes this book all the more remarkable is that Builder, writing in 1989, just as the Soviet Union was coming to pieces, was able to see that the Army had already been repeatedly tasked with carrying out styles of war that really did not follow the 1944/45 triumph of the nation in arms narrative. He foresaw that this would continue to be the case and that the other two services would continue in their role of offering necessary support without having to question either of their fundamental self conceptions. He could not, of course, have predicted the unending war in the Islamic world of the "all-volunteer" force, but the challenge that has created for the Army's self conception would certainly be of no surprise to anyone using this work as a guide.In many ways, Builder so correctly captured today's reality from the perspective of 25 years ago. Close air support is still an orphan in the Air Force as it tries to shed the A10 force. Minesweeping is still the lowest status job in the Navy and the aircraft carrier is still king even though debate is allowed on the subject. Engineers and civil action assets are still undervalued in the Army. The tension between Special Operations and line combat arms in the Army goes on. He also made clear that in the final analysis, it was going to be the Army and its commitment to ground based action that would actually define American commitment to military activity. The best example of that after the writing of this book was in the Balkan wars where the use of or credible threat of ground force action was the factor that forces the Serbs to consent to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia.I think Builder really had the point of view that the personnel of the services were good and well meaning people but quite constrained by the necessarily strong internal cultures and cultural assumptions he identified. It is perhaps unfortunate that he used the word "toys" to describe the machinery of combat that each service employs, though he did try to explain he did not mean it as disrespectfully as it sounds.In the end, this book could seem discouraging to potential military reformers but Builder wanted to make the point that change had to be worked through the culture as it really existed, taking truly into account the fundamental and different self images of the services. From this point of view this work is of quite significant value. Many books are out there about our military and what is wrong with it and what needs to change. Reading this book should provide a better perspective on all the others.

Despite being dated, this book still offers some useful insights into military culture and values. But the military has evolved since this book was written. Builder should consider an update to his work to accommodate the changes that have occurred. Also leaves out the Marines. Sort of a significant omission.

Excellent book! Anyone who has experience dealing with the various armed services will really enjoy this book--and get a much better understanding of why the services are the way they are. If you're thinking of working in the Pentagon, you have to read this book!

The book showed up on time and appeared to be like new. However, the binding completely fell apart on its first reading. I'm not at all rough on books, and this is the first time I've experienced it. However, it may be due to the age of the book.

Seminal book on this topic-it is what you would expect it to be - somewhat dry and academic, but well written and worth a look

A must read for the professional. I bought 5 of them for some folks who work for me. The material is timeless. Seminal Work.

good price; shipped quickly.

米軍という巨大な組織のあり方を決定する要因は何か―本書は、組織論の中でも最も難度が高いであろうこの論点について、一つの仮説を提示しようとするものである。　それによれば、米軍のあり方を決定する主要因であると巷間信じられている脅威認識は重要な役割を果たしていない。むしろ、各軍種が持つ制度的・文化的な嗜好（著者の用語法とは異なるが、「組織文化」と言い換えてもよいだろう）こそが各軍種の組織のあり方を決めているという。そして、脅威に対応するために案出されて組織のあり方を基礎付けているかのように考えられている各軍種の「戦略」は、実際のところ、各軍種が自らの嗜好に沿った組織のあり方を守るために必要な対外説明用のストーリーに過ぎないとされている。　この考え方は、米軍という巨大な組織を観察するための視点の一つとして、確かに有用である。戦略的な思考枠組みによって米軍の歴史を解釈するオーソドックスかつ抽象的な道を辿ってきた学習者は、本書によってより現実的な視点があることに気付かされるだろう。　しかし、本書が唱える仮説をそのまま米軍観察に援用するわけにはいかない。仮説の実証に厳密性を欠いているし、陸軍賛美の風が見受けられる（他軍種と比べて著者と陸軍の関係がより強いことが影響したのか、と勘繰ってしまう）点も気になる。そして何より、米軍のあり方を決定する要因は各軍種の嗜好以外にも多く存在し、各要因が帯びる重要性はより基本的な歴史の文脈に左右されるのではないか。国際・国内政治情勢が比較的変化に乏しい時代において本書の仮説が高い説明価値を持つ場合もあるかもしれないが、変化が大きい時代にあってなおこの仮説を主張できるのかは疑問を感じるところである。　軍のあり方は軍本来の任務と関係の深い抽象的思考―つまりは戦略的思考―によってのみ導かれているわけではなく、現実的で、利己的で、見ようによっては汚い、そんな要因に大きく左右される、ということを意識させてくれる点で、本書は役に立つ。しかし、「米軍のあり方を決定している要因は何か」という当初の論点を考える際には、本書の仮説に依拠するわけにはいかない。歴史的文脈を踏まえて複数の要因を比較考量する、という当たり前のことを自分でやるしかないのだろう。