Prelude to Blitzkrieg: The 1916 Austro-German Campaign in Romania (Twentieth-Century Battles)

Mr. Barrett’s fresh look of a long-neglected aspect of World War I that influenced the course of war is brought alive under the form of an interesting and compelling study.As many people know, while the operations on the Romanian front during 1916-1917 had important consequences for the Entente, they occupy a small chapter in their total war effort. Undoubtedly, Mr. Barrett’s new and well-organized study fills a critical gap in our understanding of the”Great War” and it is a valuable contribution to the military history.After a short preface, in the first chapter (“Romania enters war”) the author described the state and the (poor) capabilities of the Romanian Army, political leaders and domestic defense industry limited possibilities. This is followed by the description of the initial advance on the main axis in Transylvania.Chapter 2 (“The central powers respond”) follows the same pattern as in chapter 1, but with the description of Central Powers side capabilities, plans, leadership and the deployment of the their forces in that new theater of war, rated by Ludendorff a top priority. These initial decisions, rapid operational moves plus German (qualitative) reinforcements actually sealed the fate of the 1916 campaign. Without the massive German reinforcements and their superior war experience, their allies (Austro-Hungarian, Bulgaria and Ottoman Empire) definitely could not block/advance, or win the campaign. History recorded that Romania defeated and occupied some parts of Bulgaria in 1913 and wiped out in 1919 Hungarian Red Revolution and seized Budapest.Chapter 3 (“The first Dobrogea campaign”) and 5 (“The second Dobrogea Campaign”) show the operations on the Dobrogean Front since Central Powers decided to answer the invasion of Transylvania with an attack on Romania's southern border. As accurately described in this book, the Romanian and later, Russian, attempt to defend Dobrogea (The fall of Turtucaia fortress, Flamanda maneuver etc) during the first two months of the war, was a costly affair. Apart of losing the territory the personnel losses were heavy. As elsewhere, the German support proved decisive at all levels (general Mackensen’s abilities come first) and I personally believe that Bulgarians and Ottoman troops couldn't win this campaign on their own.Chapters 4 (“Clearing Transylvania”), 6 (“Stalemate in the Mountains”), 7 (“Moldavia: the forgotten front”) and 8 (“The drive across Walachia”) are dedicated to the Austro-German counteroffensive in Transylvania, battles on the frontiers, the struggle to defend Wallachia and the retreat to Moldovia. As throughout the book, the author presents the facts quite objectively, sparing neither side from criticism where it is due. The role and the influence of the French Military Mission in Romania led by General Berthelot are also presented.“The fall of Bucharest and the end of the 1916 Campaign” is summarized in Chapter 9, which ends with a short casualty part.After the alert description of the military operations on different parts of the Romanian front, the author made, in a rather slower, but comprehensive pace, a short and accurate description of the 1917 events (“Stalemate in Southeast Europe”). Retraining and reequipping of the new Romanian Army with French support, disintegration of the Russian forces, Brest-Litovsk treaty, etc are not missing from the facts described.If this much-needed French help (especially heavy artillery, machine guns and aircraft) had came in 1916 or earlier, most probably the 1916 defeat could have been avoided. Also, the author briefly described the summer 1917 famous battles of Marasti (wrongly presented as a feint aimed to Bucharest, actually it was Focsani), Marasesti and Oituz. These Romanian successes demonstrated that Romanian troops, if properly trained and equipped, could fight on a par with any opponent. The successful performance of the (new) Romanian army in 1917 restored Romania's credibility with the Entente allies, as it turned out.In November 1918 (not described in this book), the same army reentered combat and concluded the war on the victorious side, made possible the union of Transylvania with Romania (on December 1, 1918), that is, the initial aim at the beginning of war back in 1916.In the final chapter (Conclusion) author provide interesting analyses of the prime factors which decided the outcome of the campaign. Among them, author explained the timing, strategy, location, experience etc.The conclusion part is good, but there are some curious statements. I wondered how the author could think that a “neophyte army” (page 304) could advance as far as Istanbul with no expeditionary capabilities, experience and poor equipment facing two enemy countries (Bulgaria and Ottoman Empire) and possible German support? This could happen only if Allies questionable promises could be kept and a coordinated effort could be materialized in general offensives on all fronts. But this didn’t happen and Entente inactivity allowed Central Powers to concentrate undisturbed their forces in Romania.The second aspect is not only unjust, but also unsupported and intriguing (page 304):”But Romania had not joined the war to help the Entente”. Where is this coming from?? After all, we have to remember how the Allies pledged Romania to enter war to lessen the pressure on the Western Front or in different theaters of war: Italy, Galicia, France or Balkans! The deployment in 1916-1917 of over 40 enemy divisions in Romania not only substantially helped Allied cause, provided relief in some theaters and also saved many lives. Central Powers had administered a crushing defeat and occupied two-thirds of Romanian territory, but at the cost of diverting substantial military forces they needed on other fronts.Another irksome observation is that in numerous places in the book appeared “Hungary” or “Romanian invasion of Hungary” or “Arad, Hungary”, a sensitive issue, which, from many perspectives, is wrong and tendentious, not to mention the revisionist flavor. The Romanian-inhabited province of Transylvania was part, at that time, of Austro-Hungary (Habsburg) Empire. Hungary, as a state, was established after WW I. Also we cannot speak about Turkey at that time (use Ottoman Empire). I surmise that Mr. Barrett, a skilful researcher indeed, posses only superficial knowledge about the history of these places, despite his “wonderful” trip in Romania.The title is attractive and promising, but the demonstration of the thesis I believe is a little bit too forced and less successful in clarifications. Rapid movements, envelopments, tactical/operational maneuvers were characteristic to many wars (see Napoleonic wars, French-Prussian 1870-71 war or initial battles of WW I). Kesselschlacht (cauldron battles), also a hallmark of Blitzkrieg, but this never happened, at grand scale, in the Romanian theatre. It is true, however, that lessons learned from this conflagration, plus the development of new weapons (tanks, bombers, assault aircraft, armored troop carriers etc) during and at the end of WW I provided the pillars of the new doctrine.The text is supported by 15 useful maps (some are too small and difficult to read) that show the deployments and course of action for the major battles on this front. Very good are also 33 B&W photographs showing the key military & political leaders of both sides and some combat actions. There is a useful and large notes section (67 pages) and bibliography (from which Romanian archives are missing and just a few books are listed as sources, a serious methodological problem of the work) to indicate the sources of various statements, so the readers can verify their accuracy, consider the context, or follow them further. There is also a comprehensive index.I must say that Mr. Barllett’s book is the second foreign book dedicated to this campaign recently, but, sadly, it doesn’t reach the superlative level of Glenn E. Torey’s book concerning selected bibliography, coverage, detailed maps and balanced presentation.Nevertheless, with the aforementioned caveats, this book is recommended with a 4 to 5 stars rating and it is a good study for this often neglected campaign.

This book by Michael Barrett, Professor of History at the Citadel, is a joy to behold from the standpoint of its solid research and scholarship and its meticulous attention to historical accuracy and detail. This observation is especially true when seen from the viewpoint of a military historian. For a casual reader whose interest in military operations does not run to detail and the interest and ability to study and interpret maps this book would be rather daunting. For the serious-minded student of military history, however, this book is a true gem and can be said to be the “definitive history” of the Romanian campaign in 1916.For most military historians reading histories of World War I have largely been devoted to the colossal and earth-shaking battles of the Western Front: The Marne, Ypres, Verdun, the Somme, and Passchendaele to single out the most well-researched. But to the Western reader the battles of Tannenberg and Brusilov’s Galician offensive may be known to some but certainly not by most. What happened in the Transylvanian and Carpathian Mountains and on the plains of Hungary and Wallachia in 1916 would fit into this category even more.But it would be a huge mistake to ignore the conflict on the Eastern Front for events there had a direct bearing on the larger war in the West. What happened there profoundly affected world history in a permanent and profound way. Russia’s war gave way to defeat, revolution and collapse followed by the rise of the Soviet Empire and all that entailed. Lesser known is what happened to bring about the fall and dissolution of the amalgam of people, cultures and land fiefdoms known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The collapse of Austria-Hungary had a rippling affect that is still with us today in places like Serbia, Kosovo, and the patchwork of peoples in Poland, Serbia, Romania, Moldava, and Ukraine. Stalin’s post-World War II attempt to unify some of these lands again as Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito was also doomed to failure.Although the roots of the political and social calamity that befell Eastern and Southern Europe after World War I are not the subject of the book at hand, they are laid bare by a study of the 1916 campaign which knocked Romania out of the war and hastened the political changes in Russia which led to the fall of the Romanovs and the triumph of the Communists under Lenin.But what is really laid bare for the first time is how the concept of Blitzkrieg warfare evolved from set-piece, grinding men and material battles on the Western Front into free-flowing battles of flanking maneuvers and pursuit as carried out by the Central Powers in the East. In the West the war was characterized by enormous losses with gains measured in a few kilometers one way or the other. In the East the tableau was far more open, no trenches, no massive hours-long artillery barrages or coils of barbed wire that stretched from the Alps to the North Sea. We are introduced to the architects of this new kind of warfare: Mackensen, Falkenhayn, Hindenburg and Ludendorff. But, above all, it was Falkenhayn’s grasp of the need to win total victory and how to achieve it. Admittedly much of drive came from his desire to salvage his reputation, but regardless of his motivation, his fixation on a rapid campaign paid off. He accomplished his goal by relentless, unstopping pursuit coupled with a calculated willingness to advance with exposed flanks. His reliance on a mobile, combined-arms strategy not only won the day and the prize of the Romanian capital, Bucharest, albeit taken by Mackensen, no stranger to campaigns of movement. The brilliant invasion and quick defeat of Romania laid the predicate for what happened some two-and-a-half decades later in the German burst through the Ardennes which led to the stunning fall of France by Hitler’s panzer divisions, air power and mobile artillery and infantry.Barrett gives much and deserved credit to Hans von Seeckt who fulfilled the role of Clausewitz and became the keen observer of the Eastern Front and its fluid maneuvers. Seeckt saw the advantages of mobile, combined arms warfare and introduced them into doctrine in the German Reichswehr during the inter-war years. Seeckt’s vision of a mobile and rapidly evolving battlefront spearheaded by armor for the Reichswehr became the perfect platform for Guderian and Rommel to build on later for their adaptations which became known to history as Lightning War - Blitzkrieg.Personally, I found Barrett’s descriptions of combat in the high mountain passes of the Transylvanian Alps separating Austria-Hungary from Romania to be the most interesting passages of all. Until I read them I was unfamiliar with the difficulties and peculiarities of warfare at altitude under extreme weather conditions of rain, snow and ice. This was a revelation and a delight to read.All in all this book is a must-read for the dedicated and serious-minded military historian who wants to explore in substantial detail the innovative strategy and tactics followed by the Central Powers on the Eastern Front. I know it was a revelation to me and I know it will be for you too.Bryan I. Fugate, Ph.D., Austin, Texas, January 2014Author of:Operation Barbarossa, 1984Thunder on the Dnepr, 2001Major Bob Unvarnished, 2004

Brilliant book on the Romanian campaign. Its a bit later than Glen Torreys equally brilliant The Romanian Battle in World war one (I've only found two books on Romania in WWI and both are brilliant). The author is more interested in the Central Powers side than Torrey but he still covers the Romanian side well and is very good on the Russians and French Military Mission. My only criticism is some orders of battle would help as the Romanian high command (as the author notes) was something of a revolving door. If you are looking for a book on the 1916 campaign this is the best source, if you want the whole of Romania in the war try Torrey but if you are interested in the Eastern Front you really should try both

Les combats de la première guerre mondiale ne se sont pas limités au front de l'Ouest et ont pris un aspect tout différent à la frontière de l'Autriche-Hongrie. L'attaque de la Roumanie a déclenché une guerre de mouvement qui s'est retournée contre elle. Cette narration vivante et précise nous l'explique en détail

The maps could be a little more detailed. Very well researched with a lot of side information! A clear buy for military history interested.

Poorly and dully written. Needs more maps. What maps there are are inaccurate with towns in the wrong places e.g Odorheiu Secuiesc shown to the west of Christuru Secuiesc. Placenames misspelt and inconsistencies in using Romanian, Hungarian and German placenames in Transylvania. Incorrect use of accents in Hungarian placenames and no use at all in Romanian placenames. Really disappointing book.